State of MCP security in Francophone African mobile money (Oct 2026)
he first security review of the MCP servers that move money across Francophone West and Central Africa. Seven servers across a dozen countries, none of which had ever been audited: Orange Money WebPay (about 12 countries including Cameroon), MTN MoMo, CinetPay, Deggo, Wave and others.
Five findings, all disclosed to the maintainers before publication (theYahia/WWmcp#73 and Tahsine/momo-mcp#1). It covers the layer the model reads rather than the code:
- a partner PIN passed as a tool parameter, so it arrives in the model's context window;
- an outbound payout primitive with no spend ceiling, no beneficiary allow-list and no approval gate, whose own description tells the model that no further friction applies;
- payer_message, free text displayed on a payer's handset with no template — the model composes the message a victim reads before entering their PIN.
It also documents a false positive found in the author's own scanner, and explains why a training corpus with no non-English text produces a detector that flags every properly documented tool.
Published in English and French. Fully reproducible: the tool-definition dump and a test that pins the report's numbers ship in the repository.
Imported from a community submission, needs review.